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Friday, April 17, 2020 | History

2 edition of Political-economy arguments for uniform tariff found in the catalog.

Political-economy arguments for uniform tariff

Arvind Panagariya

Political-economy arguments for uniform tariff

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  • 24 Currently reading

Published by Country Economics Dept., World Bank in Washington, DC (1818 H St., NW, Washington 20433) .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Tariff -- Mathematical models.,
  • Protectionism -- Mathematical models.

  • Edition Notes

    StatementArvind Panagariya and Dani Rodrik.
    SeriesPolicy, research, and external affairs working papers ;, WPS 681
    ContributionsRodrik, Dani.
    Classifications
    LC ClassificationsHG1731 .P38 1991
    The Physical Object
    Pagination25 p. :
    Number of Pages25
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL1778214M
    LC Control Number92134236

    An Economics Reading List Free Trade Bastiat, Frederic, Economic Sophisms Bastiat is free trade’s greatest popularizer. This book collects his principal essays exposing the flaws that infect all arguments against free trade. This book contains dozens of Bastiat’s most lively essays. If you are looking for just one to sample, try his classic candle-making satire: [ ].   Tariff Wars and the Politics of Jacksonian America attempts to show why the tariff was an important part of the national narrative in the antebellum period. The debates in Congress over the tariff were acrimonious, with pitched arguments between politicians, interest groups, newspapers, and a broader : William K. Bolt. Tariffs of the United States in (United States) The following information about Tariffs of the United States. is from the Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and the Political History of the United States by the Best American and European Writers.. TARIFFS OF THE UNITED STATES. The theory of tariff taxation has been discussed in this work in the article CUSTOMS : J. Lloyd. IN POLITICAL ECONOMY VI. HARVARD COLLEGE. TARIFF LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES. Cambridge, Mass. Published for Members of Harvard University by the Harvard Co-operative Society. For others by A. A. Waterman. [p. 2] POLITICAL ECONOMY VI. PART I. IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS AND PAPERS. Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures.


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Political-economy arguments for uniform tariff by Arvind Panagariya Download PDF EPUB FB2

Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff by Avind Panagariya World Banik and University of Maryland and Dani Rodrik Hanrard Untversity, CEPR, and NBER Table of Contents 1. Model I: The Free-Rider Effect 5 2.

Model II: The Input Price Effect 16 3. Model III: Precomniitment Effect 20 4. NBER Program(s):International Trade and Investment, International Finance and Macroeconomics. Uniform tariffs have become increasingly popular in recent years, yet their economic rationale is not strong.

We identify and evaluate three sets of reasons as to why governments may prefer tariff uniformity as a means of alleviating political motives for excessive by: Political-economy arguments for a uniform tariff. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, [] (OCoLC) Material Type: Internet resource: Document Type: Book, Internet Resource: All Authors / Contributors: Arvind Panagariya; Dani Rodrik; National Bureau of.

Doc Name Political economy arguments for uniform tariffs Keywords uniform tariff;tariff uniformity;political economy of trade policy;Trade Policies;Canadian Journal of Economics;world price;tariff rate;high real interest rate;quantitative Cited by: We consider three political-economy arguments in favor of a uniform tariff rule (UTR).

First, if tariffs are determined by lobbying, adoption of a UTR creates a free-rider problem. A tariff resulting from lobbying by one sector becomes available to all Political-economy arguments for uniform tariff book sectors.

This reduces incentive for lobbying. Uniform tariffs have become increasingly popular in recent years, yet their economic rationale is not strong. We identify and evaluate three sets of reasons as to why governments may prefer tariff uniformity as a means of alleviating political motives for excessive protection.

Political economy arguments for uniform tariffs (英语) 摘要. During the s the Bank aggressively promoted greater uniformity in tariffs in developing countries. The Bank's structural adjustment and trade reform programs have often recommended abolition of quantitative import restrictions and increased uniformity Cited by: Political economy arguments for uniform tariffs (Английский) Аннотация.

During the s the Bank aggressively promoted greater uniformity in tariffs in developing countries. The Bank's structural adjustment and trade reform programs have often recommended abolition of quantitative import restrictions and increased uniformity Cited by: We consider three political-economy arguments in favor of a uniform tariff rule (UTR).

First, if tariffs are determined by lobbying, adoption of a UTR creates a free-rider problem. A tariff resulting from lobbying by one sector becomes available to all other sectors.

This reduces incentive for : Arvind Panagariya and Dani Rodrik. Publisher Summary One of the most interesting questions about the political economy of tariffs is the extent to which they are an opportunistic response to political influence or leverage rather than the result of various types of principled behavior patterns.

political-economy arguments for a uniform tariff have simply not been spelled out. This is all the more surprising since in recent years the literature on the political economy of trade policy has grown rapidly.

In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of some political-economy arguments for uniform ariffs. The paper follows the tradition of Brock and Magee (), Findlay and Wellisz (), FeenatraCited by: Political economy arguments for uniform tariffs (الانكليزية) الخلاصة.

During the s the Bank aggressively promoted greater uniformity in tariffs in developing countries. The Bank's structural adjustment and trade reform programs have often recommended abolition of Cited by: First, a free-rider effect may be conducive to less lobbying under a uniform tariff regime than under a regime in which tariffs are allowed to differ.

Second, an input-price effect may dampen the enthusiasm of final-goods producers for import protection. Abstract This chapter examines the arguments for and against a uniform tariff structure. Arguments against uniformity are: terms of trade; ‘strategic,’ infant or restructuring industry considerations, revenue or balance of payments purposes, and tariffs as a negotiating tool at the by: 1.

Some of these arguments support tariffs as first best policies and if these arguments are accepted would call for non-uniform tariffs. These include tariffs: (a) to exploit a monopsony position and thereby improve the terms-of-trade; and (b) to maximize benefits from a "strategic" application of protection.

This paper analyzes whether uniform tariffs give rise to the highest welfare compared with tariffs that either escalate or de-escalate along the value chain of production. We show that countries may be better off with de-escalating tariffs where tariff rates are higher on intermediate inputs and lower on final goods.

Manufacturing industries. During the mids, the sector shifted its focus to software from hardware. From onwards, the policy changed from an inward-oriented, state directed and controlled development strategy to a liberal economy that opened up to external competition and investment.

We consider three political-economy arguments in favor of a uniform tariff rule (UTR). First, if tariffs are determined by lobbying, adoption of a UTR creates a free-rider problem.

A tariff resulting from lobbying by one sector becomes available to all other sectors. This reduces incentive for : Mary Amiti. Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff International Economic Review,34, (3), View citations (29) See also Working Paper () REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION WITHOUT EXCESS BURDEN* Economics and Politics,5, (1), View citations (1) The Positive Economics of Policy Reform.

We consider three political-economy arguments in favor of a uniform tariff rule (UTR). First, if tariffs are determined by lobbying, adoption of a UTR creates a free-rider : Yoshitomo Ogawa. The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs: An Empirical Analysis provides information pertinent to the political economy of trade barriers.

This book discusses the cross-sectional regression analysis across industries to understand why some industries have been more privileged than Edition: 1. This paper, based on the considerable practical experience of the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department, sets out a successful strategy for modernizing customs administration.

The essence is to establish transparent and simple rules and procedures, and to foster voluntary compliance by building a system of self-assessment supported by well-designed audit policies.

POLITICAL-ECONOMY ARGUMENTS FOR A UNIFORM TARIFF* BY ARVIND PANAGARIYA AND DANI RODRIK1 We consider three political-economy arguments in favor of a uniform tariff rule (UTR). First, if tariffs are determined by lobbying, adoption of a UTR creates a free-rider problem.

A tariff resulting from lobbying by one sector becomes available to all other sectors. political economy. I felt that Germany must abolish her internal tariffs, and by the adoption of a common uniform commercial policy towards foreigners, strive to attain to the same degree of commercial and industrial development to which other nations have attained by means of their commercial policy.

“Political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas.” Journal of International Economics, 19 (November A. and Rodrik, D.

“Political economy arguments for a uniform tariff.” International Economic Review () Trade Protectionism. In: Rowley C.K., Schneider F.

(eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff with Arvind Panagariya: w Published: International Economic Review, August citation courtesy of. Distributive Politics and Economic Growth with Alberto Alesina: w Published: Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcomgin citation courtesy of.

March This paper examines the theory underpinning the design of optimal tariffs in a developing economy, and the experience of implementation of tariff reforms.

A central issue is whether and when a case can be made for a uniform tariff structure. While theory advocates a differentiated tariff structure (except under a balance of payments objective), political economy considerations, inadequate.

Chapter 10 Political Economy and International Trade. Trade policy analysis is often conducted from the implicit vantage point of a benevolent dictator poised to choose the best policies for a country.

However, decisions about which policies to apply are rarely made by a sovereign but instead are usually made via a democratic political process. This chapter examines the arguments for and against a uniform tariff structure.

Arguments against uniformity are: terms of trade; ‘strategic,’ infant or restructuring industry considerations, revenue or balance of payments purposes, and tariffs as a negotiating tool at the WTO.

Political Economy of Trade Policy, (). Political-economy arguments for a uniform tariff, (). Protection for sale, (). The Logic of Collective Action, (). The Political Economy of. The Uniform Tariff Issue Further Considered 17 The Case Against a Uniform Tariff 17 The Case for a Uniform Tariff 19 Evaluation 21 5.

A Summary of the Literature 21 6. Summary of the Paper 25 References 27 * I am deeply indebted to Ramon Lopez and Vinod Thomas for discussions at various stages of this work. Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff,” (). Product Differentiation andAuthor: Beata S. Javorcik and Gaia Narciso.

America's Protectionist Takeoff should be mandatory reading for all students of economics, finance, business, and history.

The notion that free trade is the only viable economic perspective, often assumed to be the case in universities these days, is to be ignorant of so much, including the most fundamental debate in nineteenth century American politics - both before the Civil War 5/5(4). Start studying Chapter 17 International Trade Vocab.

Learn vocabulary, terms, and more with flashcards, games, and other study tools. agreements that abolish trade barriers among the members and establish uniform tariffs for non-members a specific region in which trade between nations takes place without protective tariffs.

imports. true in when the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) was signed with objectives of encouraging international trade, and reducing tariff as possible. [1] A. A Country’s Protectionism: Blooming Glory A country‘s protectionism will mean the protection of home industries or ‗infant industries‘ (until they are large.

VII.B Other Books 2. "Gains from Trade under Variable Returns to Scale, Commodity Taxation, Tariffs "Political Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff," International Economic. Daniel Hannan’s book illustrates the naïve and fact-free approach, of some people on the Brexit side, to our future outside the EU.

As you say, he’s quite good at painting this picture of the UK as a very globalized free trading nation, trading with other countries of the world with very low tariffs—while not being part of any particular. The leading contention of the early protectionists was, as in the arguments for the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act ofthat protection would alleviate the depression in agriculture and industry.

And most of the other standard arguments such as that for the home market, aid to. Tariffs have inspired a profusion of economic speculation and argument. The arguments for tariffs have one thing in common: Political Economy (New York: Charles Scribners’ Sons, ), pp.

George, Protection or Free Trade, pp. 45– was published in by the Mises Institute and is the source of this html book. II – TRADE AND PUBLIC POLICIES: A CLOSER LOOk AT NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 49 B.

A N ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE USE OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES Contents 1 Reasons for government intervention and types of measures 50 2 The choice of NTMs in light of domestic and international constraints 63 3 Measures affecting trade in services.

ARGUMENTS FOR TARIFFS' By J. BLACK 1. The purpose of this paper is to give a brief summary of the possible arguments in economic theory for the imposition of tariffs or export duties, or the adoption of methods such as multiple currency practices which have analogous effects.

It will discuss the circumstances in which.ADVERTISEMENT by THE AMERICAN EDITOR, TO THE FIFTH EDITION. No work upon political economy, since the publication of Dr.

Adam Smith's profound and original Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, has attracted such general attention, and received such distinguished marks of approbation from competent judges, as the "Traite D'Economie Politique," of M. Say.Setting trade tariff rates at a uniform level limits public officials' ability to extract bribes from importers.

By explicitly accounting for the interaction between importers and corrupt customs officials, Gatti argues that setting trade tariff rates at a uniform level limits public .